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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v,

t

THAYNE LARRY WALKER,

:

Case No. 900545

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Has defendant preserved for appellate review his

claim that the trial court erred in ruling that two of his prior
felony convictions were admissible under rule 609, Utah Rules of
Evidence?

A defendant must testify at trial to preserve for

appellate review a claim of improper impeachment with a prior
conviction.
2.

State v> Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987).
Since there was no ruling on the reliability of

eyewitness identification evidence prior to its admission at
trial, are the circumstances surrounding the eyewitness
identifications so undisputed and clear that the only reasonable
assumption is that the trial court found the facts in accordance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

with its decision to admit the evidence?

Even when a trial court

fails to enter requisite factual findings to reach any necessary
legal conclusions, an appellate court will uphold the lower court
ruling "whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court
actually made such findings" based on the competent evidence in
the record.
1991).

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 787-88 n.6 (Utah

"If the ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption

unreasonable, however, [the appellate court should] remand for a
new trial."

Id,, at 788.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules applicable to a determination of this case are set forth in
the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 18, 1989, defendant was charged with
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990) (R. 6-7). Subsequently, an amended
information was filed which additionally charged defendant with
being a habitual criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-81001 (1990) (R. 30-31).
Defendant filed three pretrial motions to suppress
various eyewitnesses' identifications (R. 19, 32-38, 49-50).

The

motions were denied (R. 18, 51). Defendant also filed a pretrial
motion to suppress introduction of any of his prior convictions
(R. 22, 62-64, 83-88).

The motion was granted as to three prior

convictions but denied on two felony convictions (R. 44, 98).

•

-

:

2

•

•

-

•

•
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From July 7 through 12, 1990, a jury trial on the
aggravated robbery charge was held before the Honorable Scott
Daniels, Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah
(R. 98-104).

A guilty verdict was returned as charged (R. 104).

In a separate proceeding on July 16, 1990, defendant was found to
be a habitual criminal (R. 217). On October 5, 1990, defendant
was sentenced to the statutory term of five years to life in the
Utah State Prison on the aggravated robbery conviction, the
habitual criminal sentence was merged with that of the robbery,
and a one year consecutive sentence was imposed under the firearm
enhancement provision, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1990) (R. 235,
243-45, 247-48).

Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal (R.

251).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 18, 1989, a lone masked gunman robbed a Taco
Bell of $800.00 dollars (T. 16-29).l

After entering the fast

food restaurant, the gunman jumped the customer counter and said,
"This is a stick up" (T. 21, 187). The robber motioned Trista
Valdez, an employee, to the safe, grabbed a money bag in it, and
stated, "I will take this" (T. 20-21, 146, 188, 190). The robber
then motioned Ms. Valdez to the cash registers and removed more
1

The various volumes of transcripts are not numbered
consistently in this case. While some of the volumes use an
initial record cite with internal pages having a transcript cite,
other volumes use record cites for each page of transcript. Since
the transcripts of the trial use initial record cites but the
internal pages are numbered consecutively, any references to the
trial transcripts will simply be as (T. — ) , using the consecutive
page numbers. Cites to other volumes will use the record cites as
designated.
3
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money (T. 25-29, 146-48).

The robber told the employees, "Don't

even try anything or I will kill you" (T. 26, 89, 144, 189). The
robber then jumped back over the counter and left Taco Bell (T.
29-30, 90).
Two women sitting in a car across from Taco Bell saw
the robber emerge from the restaurant at the same time that they
heard a robbery had occurred (T. 225-27).

As the robber

continued walking down the street, the women followed in their
vehicle.

They could not see the robber's face but did see him

get into the passenger side of a light blue Datsun or Toyota
automobile parked in a field about a block from Taco Bell (T.
228-230).

They observed the license plate of the vehicle and

reported the number to the police (T. 231).
Subsequent investigation of the license plate number
determined that it matched a blue Toyota registered to Thomas
Bridwell, but used by his daughter, Linda Bridwell Rice, a friend
of defendant (T. 259, 267-68, 303, 310).
Within minutes of the robbery, the police arrived at
Taco Bell (T. 170). Four employees, Trista Valdez, Randy Orvin,
Lance Ewing, and Jerod Stern, described the robber as a male, in
his late 20's or early 30's, between 6'1" to 6'4" feet tall,
weighing between 165 and 170 pounds, with light brown or
brownish-blond long hair, light blue eyes, and with very wrinkled
skin surrounding his eyes (T. 20, 87-88, 148, 150, 191-93).
Because the robber wore a ski mask, they could not see his face
except for the eyes and a little of the mouth (T. 21, 86, 149,
4
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163, 192). Little pieces of a mustache were discernable around
the mouth (T. 70-71, 86, 148). When the robber spoke, his voice
was deep and gruff (T. 37). The witnesses agreed that the
robbery had occurred "pretty quick," lasting no more than five
minutes and possibly less than three minutes (T. 59, 169, 179,
190, 192, 195).
Approximately one week after the robbery, a photo
spread was separately shown to the four employees (T. 266).
While the photo spread contained six photographs of different
men, only defendant and one other individual pictured had blue
eyes (T. 265-66; Exhibit 15). Based on the eye color, the
witnesses subsequently testified that they only considered these
two pictures (T. 52-53, 107, 200-01).

None of the witnesses made

a positive identification but they did identify defendant and the
other blue-eyed individual as being similar to the robber (T. 3840, 96, 156-57, 198-99).
On September 15, 1989, a formal lineup was held (R.
263; Exhibit 8). Defendant appeared with six other individuals.
All were masked and directed to repeat some of the phrases used
during the robbery (R. 263 at 2, 4). None of the Taco Bell
employees positively identified defendant.

However, Stern,

Orvin, and Ewing identified defendant as possibly being the
robber, while Valdez tentatively identified another individual
(R. 263 at 13-14; T. 41-44, 97-99, 157-59, 202-04).
Prior to the preliminary hearing in December 1989, a
second lineup was conducted at defendant's request (R. 294-95).
5
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Defendant appeared in the December lineup with six individuals
different than those participating in the September lineup.

The

\

lineup was two-fold: first, the men appeared masked and spoke
phrases; second, they appeared unmasked and were silent (R. 31920, 322, 323-24).

When the men appeared masked, Stern

,

tentatively identified defendant as the robber, Valdez
tentatively identified another individual, and Ewing made no
identification.

When the men then appeared unmasked, Stern

positively identified defendant, Valdez tentatively identified
defendant, and Ewing continued to identify no one (R. 333, 336;
T. 44-47, 161-63, 204-06).2
Prior to trial, defendant filed three motions to
suppress the out-of-court identifications and to restrict any incourt identifications of defendant (R. 19, 32-38, 49-50).

Among

other issues, defendant argued that the photo spread and lineups
were conducted in a suggestive manner and that the witnesses had
no basis from which to make an unmasked identification (R. 32,
49-50, 271, 280). Neither defendant nor the State presented any
facts surrounding the actual identifications, instead focusing on
the procedures utilized in conducting the lineups (R. 264, 304).
The trial court denied the motions (R. 18, 51).
At trial, Ewing, Stern, and Orvin positively identified
defendant as the robber

(T. 91-92, 154, 197).

Aside from the identifications, an immunized witness,

2

Orvin was not available to participate in the December
lineup (T. 99).
6
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Toni Christenson, testified that in mid-August 1989, defendant
and Linda Bridwell Rice asked her to secure a gun for them so
that they could "make some money" (T. 303, 305-06, 309).
Christenson took a gun from her father's home and gave it to
defendant (T. 310-311, 313). A few nights later, defendant and
Rice came over to an apartment where Christenson was and said
that they had been "making money" (T. 313-317).

Defendant had

the gun and a money bag containing coins in Taco Bell wrappers
(T. 315, 320-22).

On cross-examination, it was established that

Christenson was related to Rice but had disputes with her and
"wanted to get her in trouble," to "set up Linda" (T. 325-330,
337).

For this reason and because she wanted to "clear up" her

criminal record, Christenson related these incidents to the
police in April 1990, approximately eight months after the
robbery (T. 330-32, 343). Christenson was unsure of when she
secured the gun for defendant since she was drinking extensively
and using other drugs, including Soma, hycodaphen, heroin and
downers (T. 334-337).3
Defendant did not testify on his own behalf but did
present an alibi witness (T. 421-32; R. 268 at 3-4). The jury
returned a guilty verdict on aggravated robbery (R. 214).

3

Other evidence established that the owner of the gun
reported it stolen in mid-August 1989.

7
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pretrial, the court ruled that if defendant testified,
two of his prior felony convictions would be admissible to
impeach his credibility pursuant to rule 609, Utah Rules of
Evidence,

During trial, defendant was advised that case law

required him to testify in order to preserve his appellate
challenge to the court's ruling.

Defendant did not testify and

has, therefore, waived any challenge to the pretrial ruling.
No pretrial ruling was made on the reliability, and
hence, constitutional admissibility, of the eyewitness
identifications of defendant.

Since the record on appeal is

inadequate to support the conclusion that the trial court would
have necessarily found facts only in support of admissibility,
the case should be remanded for a new trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR PURPOSES
OF APPELLATE REVIEW ANY CHALLENGE TO THE
TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT TWO OF HIS
PRIOR FELONY CONVICTIONS WERE ADMISSIBLE
UNDER RULE 609, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE.
In Points I and IA of his brief, defendant argues that
the trial court erroneously concluded that two of defendant's
prior felony convictions were admissible for purposes of
impeachment pursuant to rule 609, Utah Rules of Evidence, and
that this Court should consider the merits of defendant's claim
despite his failure to testify at trial.

Specifically, defendant

acknowledges that Utah law requires him to testify to preserve a

8
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challenge under rule 609 (Br. of App. at 11). See State v.
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987); State v. Banner, 717
P.2d 1325, 1331 (Utah 1986).

Yet, defendant asserts that he

should be exempted from this mandate because of "a combination of
inaccurate advice by both his counsel and the trial judge" (Br.
of App. at 11). Defendant's argument lacks legal and factual
support.
Defendant presented several witnesses on his behalf at
trial (T.373, 383, 386, 421). At the close of the defense case,
the court inquired of counsel if she had any more witnesses to
present (R. 268 at 1-4). In response, defendant's counsel
replied:
I don't believe we do, your honor. And I
should indicate that Mr. Donaldson and I and
Thayne [defendant] have talked at length
about his right to testify and indicated to
him that he has an absolute right to testify.
We both advise him not to testify based upon
what's come in and what we have argued. And
I believe he's willing to accept and follow
that advice. He certainly was concerned
about testifying to preserve the 609 issue.
And that's a concern of ours as well, but I
think that given your ruling on the 609 issue
that would be very, very risky.
(R. 268 at 3). The court directly questioned defendant
concerning his decision not to testify which defendant affirmed
(R. 268 at 4). The following exchange then occurred:
[THE COURT]: Now, I understand, and I guess
the record should clearly reflect, that one
of the reasons that you've made that decision
is because of my ruling on the question of
whether prior convictions could be brought
up. And your attorneys, of course, have
objected to my ruling on that and established
on the record at considerable length, and

9
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also in a motion to reconsider, that you
object to that. And I understand that your
decision is based, in part, on that ruling
and that's preserved for appeal.
Does that sufficiently cover that,
Ms. Bowman?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I guess I should add,
it's our opinion that the case law would
probably require him to testify to be able to
appeal that. The name of the case is
escaping me at the moment, but that's how we
talked to him about that issue. And they've
been wrong on that, but we don't know — but
that's what we believe.
[THE COURT]: You've discussed that with him
and based upon all the factors and based upon
the advice of your attorneys you decide not
to testify, is that right, Mr. Walker?
[DEFENDANT]:
(R. 268 at 4).

That's right.

The record does not support defendant's claim

that he was so substantially misadvised as to the law that he
failed to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to testify
(Br. of App. at 13).
Further, neither Gentry nor Banner requires that a
defendant be advised on the record that he must testify to
preserve a rule 609 challenge.

Instead, beginning with Banner in

1986 and culminating with Gentry in 1987, this Court has
explicitly announced "for the guidance of trial courts,
defendants, and defense counsel, the following rule:

To preserve

for appellate review a claim of improper impeachment with a prior
conviction, a defendant must testify."

Gentry. 1^1 P.2d at 1036.

Having failed to testify, defendant has waived any
challenge to the court's rule 609 determination.

10
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POINT II
SINCE THERE WAS NO RULING ON THE RELIABILITY
OF THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS PRIOR TO
THEIR ADMISSION AT TRIAL AND THE RECORD ON
APPEAL CONTAINS CONFLICTING EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE RELIABILITY OF THE
IDENTIFICATIONS, NO PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF
ADMISSIBILITY ARISES AND THE CASE SHOULD BE
REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Prior to trial, defendant filed three motions to
suppress the various eyewitness identifications made of him in
the photo spread, the two lineups and the preliminary hearing (R.
19, 32-38, 49-50).

Additionally, defendant moved to prohibit any

in-court identification of him at trial (R. 49-50).

While the

motions involved multiple grounds, two reasons advanced for
suppression were: 1) the August photo spread and unmasked portion
of the December lineup were unduly suggestive; and 2) the
witnesses had an insufficient basis of knowledge from which to
make an identification (R. 32-38, 271, 273, 280-81).
Argument on the motions was held during two hearings
(R. 269, 304). In the first hearing on February 16, 1990,
defendant argued: 1) that during the September lineup, reference
was incorrectly made to the robbery as occurring on August 8th
instead of August 18th (R. 305-06, 312); and 2) that defendant's
attorney had mistakenly placed defendant in what counsel
characterized as the same position in the September lineup as in
the August photo spread (R. 307-10, 312). The court ruled that
the transcript reference to August 8th was a clerical error and
that since the witnesses had only been involved in one robbery,
the witnesses would not have been confused by any error in the
11
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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date (R. 306-07, 312A).

Regarding the positioning claimf the

court found that it did not render the lineup unreliable but
could be brought out at trial for purposes of the weight to be
accorded the identifications (R. 312A).
On May 22, 1990, a second hearing on the motions to
suppress was held (R. 269). Defendant argued: 1) that all the
out-of-court identifications should be suppressed because the
initial photo spread was suggestive (R. 271); 2) that since the
witnesses never saw the robber unmasked, it was suggestive to
have the December lineup participants appear unmasked especially
in light of the prior photo spread (R. 273); 3) that the photo
spread and lineups were suggestive because the physical
characteristics of the persons used were allegedly dissimilar to
the robber's descriptions (R. 273-75); 4) that defendant was the
only common person to the photo spread and subsequent lineups
such that the photo spread tainted the subsequent identifications
(R. 280); and 5) that the eyewitnesses did not have an
independent basis to recall or identify the robber (R. 280). The
court commented that in the prior suppression hearing he had
ruled on the suggestiveness of the photo spread and the first
lineup and, therefore, queried that if the first identifications
were not contaminated, why would the subsequent identifications
be (R. 272).A

The court then ruled that the issues now raised

A

While the court and the parties apparently thought that the
February hearing had involved a determination on the suggestiveness
of the photo spread, no such ruling was made. Instead, as noted
above, the only rulings involved the positioning claim and the
clerical error in the date of the robbery (R. 312A).
12
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went to the weight to be accorded the identifications and not
their admissibility (R. 281). Concluding that there were no due
process violations in the second lineup, the court denied the
motions to suppress (R. 279-81).

No formal findings of fact or

conclusions of law were entered.
Throughout the hearings on the motions to suppress, no
evidence was presented concerning the circumstances surrounding
the witnesses' original observations of the robber nor their
subsequent identifications of defendant.

As such, there was no

pretrial basis from which the court could analyze the requisite
factors for a determination of the constitutional admissibility
of the eyewitness identifications.

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d

774, 778-779 (Utah 1991) (state due process requires a pretrial
determination of the reliability of eyewitness identification for
it to be constitutionally admissible); Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S.
188, 198-99 (1972) (federal due process requires a determination
of the reliability of eyewitness identification for it to be
admissible).5
Despite the lack of requisite factual findings, this
Court has recognized that a trial court's ruling on the
admissibility of evidence may still be affirmed "whenever it
would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such

5

The trial in this matter was in 1989 prior to this Court's
decision in State v. Ramirez. However, the state constitutional
issue was raised by defendant on appeal. Since no determinations
of reliability and constitutional admissibility were made, the
State's argument is the same under either the then-existing Neil v.
Biqqers standard or the current Ramirez standard.

13
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findings" based on the competent evidence in the record as a
whole.

State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6.

"If the

<

ambiguity of the facts makes this assumption unreasonable,
however, [the appellate court will] remand for a new trial."

Id.

at 788.
Here, facts surrounding the identifications were
discussed at trial.

The four eyewitnesses, Stern, Ewing, Orvin,

and Valdez, give descriptions of the robber which were consistent
with each other and consistent with defendant's physical
characteristics (T. 20, 87-88, 148, 150, 191-193).

The witnesses

testified that two of the pictures in the August photo spread,
one of which was defendant, were similar to their descriptions of
the robber, but no positive identifications were made (T. 38-40,
52-53, 96, 107, 156-57, 198-99, 200-01).

In the September

lineup, after observing the masked participants and hearing their
voices, Stern, Ewing, and Orvin identified defendant as possibly
being the robber and Valdez identified another individual as
possibly being the perpetrator (R. 263 at 13-14; T. 41-44, 97-99,
157-59, 202-04).

In the December lineup, after observing

different masked participants and hearing their voices, Stern
identified defendant as possibly being the robber, Valdez
identified another individual, and Ewing identified no one.
During the second half of the same lineup when the participants
appeared unmasked and silent, Stern positively identified
defendant as the robber, Valdez identified defendant as possibly
being the robber, and Ewing could identify no one (R. 333, 336;
14
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T. 44-47, 161-63, 204-06).

The witnesses remembered seeing

defendant's face in the photo spread but asserted that they were
independently making the identifications during the unmasked
portion of the second lineup (T. 64-66, 220-21).

The day after

the second lineup, the witnesses observed defendant at the
preliminary hearing (R. 8-9, 208-09).

At trial, Valdez was not

asked to identify defendant while Stern, Ewing and Orvin
positively identified defendant (T. 67, 91-92, 154, 197).
In contradiction to this testimony, the defense
presented an eyewitness identification expert who testified that
in his opinion, these witnesses were not able to discern a
sufficient pattern of features from observing the masked robber's
face to make a reliable identification (T. 391-93, 405).
Additionally, he testified that the photo spread had an
"effective size" of two, since four of the pictures did not match
the descriptions of eye color given by the witnesses (T. 397-99).
Based on the circumstances surrounding the robbery, the expert
stated that there was less than a five percent probability that
the witnesses could make an identification (T. 402). However, he
could not state with certainty that the eyewitnesses were wrong
in claiming that they could make an identification (T. 415-16).
Taken as a whole, the facts in the record are neither
"clear, uncontroverted, [nor] capable of supporting only a
finding in favor" of admissibility.
n.6.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88

Under either the federal or state constitutional standard,

any post-trial determination of the facts in support of
15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

admissibility is curtailed by the ambiguities surrounding the
facts.

For this reason and because defendant is entitled to a

pretrial determination of the constitutional admissibility of any
eyewitness testimony, the State agrees with defendant that the
proper course is to reverse defendant's conviction and remand
this case for retrial. Accord Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction
should be reversed and the case remanded for retrial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X3(fr) day of April, 1992.
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